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No State Left Behind: An Analysis of the Post-EGTRRA
Death Tax Landscape and An Argument for Kentucky to
Repeal State Death Taxes
Mary Ellen Wimberly'
INTRODUCTION
Wealth transfers are likely to surge as the baby boomer generation passes away
over the next fifty-five years.2 For Americans wishing to pass on the maximum
amount of their hard-earned wealth to selected beneficiaries, why die in Kentucky?
At death, a Kentuckian's property is subject to the Kentucky inheritance tax when
the property is passed to certain beneficiaries.' Although such a tax was once
common, Kentucky is one of only a few remaining states that assesses any type of
state "death" tax.4 The significant burden caused by this tax has resulted in
Kentucky's inclusion on Forbes's list of "Where Not To Die" in 2012,' 2013,6
2014,7 2015,8 and 2016. 9
Kentucky has not always been at such a competitive disadvantage for elderly
taxpayers. For years, states collected revenue from the federal estate tax credit,
which essentially gave states a portion of the tax that would have otherwise been
paid to the federal government, but resulted in no additional tax liability for
taxpayers.' 0 However, the credit was phased out by the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 ("EGTRRA") and replaced by a deduction for
University of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. expected May 2016.
2 Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case for a Comprehensive
Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2009).3 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.010 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess.).
' Ashlea Ebeling, Where Not To Die in 2016, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2015, 4:33 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2015/10/16/where-not-to-die-in-2016/#4a963b57628c (see
interactive map).
' Ashlea Ebeling, Where Not To Die In 2012, FORBES (Dec. 22, 2011, 1:11 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2011/12/22/where-not-to-die-in-2012/ (see interactive
map).
6 Ashlea Ebeling, Where Not To Die In 2013, FORBES (an. 28, 2013, 12:43 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2013/01/28/where-not-to-die-in-2013/ (see interactive
map).7 Ashlea Ebeling, Where Not To Die In 2014: The Changing Wealth Tax Landscape, FORBES
(Nov. 1, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.forhes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2013/11/01/where-not-to-die-
in-2014-the-changing-wealth-tax-landscape/ (see interactive map).
' Ashlea Ebeling, Where Not To Die In 2015, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2014, 5:31 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleabeting/2014/09/ll/where-not-to-die-in-2015/ (see interactive map).
"Ebeling, supra note 4.
'5 Jeffrey A. Cooper, Interstate Competition and State Death Taxes: A Modern Crisis in Historical
Perspective, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 835, 839 (2006) [hereinafter Cooper, Interstate Competition].
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state death taxes in 2005.11 Consequently, many states that based the calculation of
their state death taxes solely on the federal estate tax credit were left with no state
estate tax revenue after the passage of the EGTRRA. Today, Kentucky is in the
minority of states that continue to pursue state death taxes and is one of only six
states with a state inheritance tax.'2 Shockingly, Kentucky's top tax rate of sixteen
percent is second only to Nebraska's top tax rate.13
Part I of this Note discusses how both types of death taxes (inheritance and
estate taxes) have progressed through history, the radical changes to the state death
tax system caused by EGTRRA, and the increase in the federal estate and gift tax
exemptions. Part H details the current death tax system in Kentucky and explores
the trend to repeal state death taxes in other states. Finally, Part III argues that
Kentucky's minority approach is unfair for a number of reasons and advocates for
state-level repeal to avoid the fleeing of valuable tax-paying individuals to
retirement havens or border states without state death taxes. Specifically, Part III
argues that Kentucky's current inheritance tax unfairly targets certain individuals,
encourages "ante-mortem capital flight," and does not generate enough income to
justify its enforcement. Furthermore, Part III discounts some of the popular
arguments in favor of keeping state death taxes, such as decreasing income
inequality, providing revenue to states, and encouraging charitable giving.
I. How Do DEATH TAXES WORK?
Kentucky's death tax laws are complex. To begin, it is important to point out
that the term "death tax" is a colloquial term that refers to two different types of
taxes imposed upon the death of an individual, namely "estate taxes" and
"inheritance taxes." 4 An estate tax is a tax imposed on the entirety of the decedent's
estate, 5 whereas an inheritance tax (sometimes referred to as a "succession tax") is a
tax collected on the value of property that a person inherits from another.' 6 To
better understand where the laws across the country stand today, this section
provides background on the legislative history of both estate and inheritance taxes,
together known as death taxes.
11 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 532, 115
Stat. 38, 73 (2001) (codified at I.R.C. § 2058 (2011)). The current deduction for certain state death
taxes is found in 26 C.F.R § 20.2053-9 (2013).12 See Ebeling, supra note 4.
13 See iL
14 See Death Tax, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).is Estate Tax, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
"I,nheritance Tax, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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A. Historical Analysis of State Death Taxes
When Congress enacted the modem federal estate tax in 1916, all but six U.S.
states already imposed a state death tax. 7 However, soon after, states began to
recognize the competitive benefits of favorable tax rates due in large part to the
advent of automobiles and thus, newly-mobile taxpayers.'" Florida, for instance, led
this charge by eliminating its state death tax in an attempt to appeal to wealthy
residents of other states by "creat[ing] a domestic 'tax haven' free from the evils of
winter snowstorms, income taxation, and death taxation."19 Other states followed
suit, and due to the success of the death tax repeal, "[m]any state leaders thus came
to worry that imposing death taxes would precipitate an exodus of their most
wealthy, and often most industrious, taxpayers."2 ° This problem inspired three
national conferences devoted to preventing the migration of states' wealthiest
taxpayers while still allowing states to collect death tax revenue.2' The conflict
ultimately resulted in Congress amending the Internal Revenue Code to provide a
dollar-for-dollar credit on a taxpayer's federal estate tax return for state death taxes
paid by the estate.22 This change allowed states to receive death tax revenue without
burdening taxpayers.
In order to maximize potential income without burdening decedents, all states,
including Florida, eventually adopted a death tax equal to the maximum federal
credit.' This tax was known as a "pick-up," "sponge," or "soak-up" tax because it
enabled the state to collect the maximum available state death credit offered by the
federal government.24 Thus, the state death tax credit served as a "great equalizer"
among the states by enabling states to collect death tax revenue without causing a
net tax burden on decedents' estates.25
17 See Eugene E. Oakes, Development ofAmerican State Death Taxes, 26 IOWA L. REV. 451, 468
(1941).
's See Cooper, Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 838.
19 Id.
2
DId.
21 See id. at 838-39.
2 See id. at 839; see also Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 301(b), 43 Stat. 253, 304.
2 Cooper, Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 839-40; Michel G. Kaplan, Wi the
Disappearing State Death Tax Credit Deliver a Knock-Out Punch to the Tennessee Inheritance Tax?,
TENN. B.J., May 2003, at 28, 29. Nevada, the last state to adopt a sponge tax, enacted it in 1987. Judith
Lohman, OLR Research Report No. 2009-9-0305-Backgrounder: Estate and Inheritance Taxes in
Connecticut and Other States, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, OFF. OF LEGAL RES. (Aug. 27, 2009),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/rpt/2009-R-0305.htm.
24 Kaplan, supra note 23, at 29.
's See Cooper, Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 839.
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B. Economic Growth and Tax ReliefReconciliation Act of2001
In 2001, Congress passed EGTRRA, one of four legislative measures popularly
referred to as the "Bush tax cuts." 26 This Act provided American taxpayers with two
major forms of federal estate tax relief by increasing the lifetime exemption amount
and reducing the maximum marginal tax rate.2 ' Although EGTRRA was costly,
resulting in a more than $1 trillion dollar reduction in federal revenue in the first
ten years after passage, 21 the overall cost was somewhat alleviated by a major
revenue provision for the federal government contained in EGTRRA: the
replacement of the state death tax credit with a state death tax deduction.2 9
Historically, a taxpayer's estate benefitted from a credit against its federal estate
tax for state estate, inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes. Everything changed
with EGTRRA, which began phasing out the state death tax credit in 2001 until it
was completely phased out and replaced with a deduction in 2005.30 This
elimination of the state death tax credit in 2005 was made permanent in 2013. 3"
Professor Cooper, a practicing attorney and visiting law professor at Yale Law
School, explained the reasoning behind the repeal of the state death tax credit in a
2004 journal article, noting that:
The federal government passed EGTRRA, but seemingly wasn't fully prepared to
pay for it. Rather, by repealing the state death tax credit, the architects of
EGTRRA placed much of the revenue burden on state governments. In fact,
during most of the coming decade, the top net marginal federal estate tax rate
may prove to be higher than it was prior to EGTRRA. Overall gross federal
estate tax rates overtly decline, but it's the states that lose much of the revenue as a
result.32
See Evan Soltas, Breaking Down the Cliff The Bush Tax Cuts, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 28,
2012, 11:46 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-11-28/breaking-down-the-cliff-the-
bush-tax-cuts.
' Jeffrey A. Cooper et al., State Estate Taxes After EGTRRA: A Long Day's Journey Into Night,
17 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 317, 320 (2004). EGTRRA originally created a new 10% tax bracket for
single filers, joint filers, and heads of household. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 101(a), 115 Stat. at 41 (codified at I.R-C. § 1(i)(1)(A) (2009)). The 15%
bracket's lower threshold was indexed to the new 10% bracket. Id. The 28% bracket was lowered to 25%
by 2006. Id. § 101, 115 Stat. at 42. The 31% bracket was lowered to 28% by 2006. Id. The 36% bracket
was lowered to 33% by 2006. Id. The 39.6% bracket was lowered to 35% by 2006. Id.
' Changes in CBO's Baseline Projections Since January 2001, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (June 7,
2012), http://www.cbo.gov/sitesdefault/fdes/cbofiles/attachments/06 -07-
ChangesSince2001Baseline.pdf.
2 Cooper et. at, supra note 27, at 318-19.
3 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 § 532 (codified at I.R.C. § 2058
(2009)).
31 Elaine Hightower Gagliardi, State Death Tax Considerations in Making Lifetime Transfers,
2014 EMERGING ISSUES 7271 (2014).
3' Cooper et al., supra note 27, at 320-21.
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Furthermore, Professor Cooper explained the significance of the repeal:
In just four years, EGTRRA thus undermined eighty years of movement towards
uniform national death taxation. The elimination of the state death tax credit
eliminated a free source of revenue for the states and rekindled old fears of
significant tax-motivated migration from states that impose death taxes to those
who do not. No amount of state legislation can reverse what EGTRRA has
wrought. 3
The complex ramifications of the repeal of the state death tax credit were
largely due to the fact that most state statutes specifically referenced the state estate
tax credit in order to determine the state estate tax liability. For instance, in
Kentucky, section 140.130 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes states that an estate
tax in addition to the Kentucky inheritance tax is assessed when the state death tax
credit allowed on the federal return exceeds the Kentucky inheritance tax.34
Essentially, the difference between the federal credit and the inheritance tax must
be paid to Kentucky as an estate tax.35 Thus, because EGTRRA repealed the state
death tax credit, it also repealed sponge state death taxes, like Kentucky's, that were
calculated by reference to the credit.3 6
Prior to the elimination of the state death tax credit in 2005, thirty-eight states
imposed only an estate tax keyed to the federal state death tax credit.37 After
EGTRRA, many of these states chose to simply let their sponge taxes expire
without pursuing alternative state death taxes, while other states engaged in a
process known as "decoupling," and responded by imposing independent state
death taxes.3" Of the remaining twelve states that imposed an inheritance or estate
tax in addition to their pick-up tax that was tied directly to the federal estate tax
credit, many states, like Kentucky, chose to continue to enforce these existing state
death tax regimes that were not tied to the credit.39
Prior to the permanent repeal of the federal estate tax credit, experts estimated
that repeal of the credit would cost states about $3 billion in annual state
revenues.' Similarly, a legislative analyst opined that post-EGTRRA, state
governments would have the "worst of both worlds," as they would collect about
" Cooper, Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 878.
34 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.130(1) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.).
35 Id.
' Cooper et al., supra note 27, at 319.
17 See JOEL MICHAEL, MINN. H.R RESEARCH DEPFT, SURVEY OF STATE ESTATE,
INHERITANCE, AND GIFT TAxES 4 (2014), available at
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/estatesurv.pdf [hereinafter MICHAEL, SURVEY].
" Id.; see also Cooper et al., supra note 27, at 319.
31 See MICHAEL, SURVEY supra note 37, at 4.
o See Norton Francis, Back from the Dead: State Estate Tax Afror the Fiscal Cfiff, Urban Institute
Tax Policy Center Research Report (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.urban.org/research/publication/back-
dead- state-estate-taxes-after-fiscal-clff/view/full-report.
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forty percent less revenue, but also force residents to pay higher taxes. 4 1 In addition
to the significance of eliminated state revenue, the state death tax deduction is also
much less advantageous to taxpayers. While a credit reduces total tax liability by a
dollar-for-dollar amount, a deduction only reduces the amount of money on which
the taxpayer is taxed. For instance, if a taxable estate of $100,000 is taxed at a
twenty percent rate, the taxpayer's tax liability is $20,000. When the taxpayer
receives a $1,000 credit, his or her tax liability is reduced by $1,000, resulting in a
tax payment of $19,000. However, a $1,000 deduction would only decrease the
taxpayer's taxable income from $100,000 to $99,000. Assuming again a twenty
percent tax rate on taxable income, the taxpayer would owe $19,800, meaning that
the $1,000 deduction only provided $200 in tax savings.
The disadvantages of a deduction as opposed to a credit to the taxpayer are even
more striking when considering that the federal estate tax exemption amount is
often much higher than the state exemption. In 2010, Congress set the federal
estate tax exemption at five million dollars.42 Because the vast majority of estates
are worth less than $5 million and thus fall under the federal exemption, most
estates are no longer taxed federally. Consequently, few taxpayers even benefit from
the state estate tax deduction, which would be deducted from the amount to be
taxed on the federal return.
More specifically, whereas state sponge taxes were only collected when the
taxpayer paid federal estate taxes, and thus only when the state death tax credit was
available, new state death taxes may be collected even when the taxpayer is unable
to benefit from the state death tax deduction. This scenario could occur, for
example, on a $3 million estate. The estate would not be required to pay federal
estate tax because the estate value falls below the federal exemption amount, but it
still may be required to pay state estate or inheritance taxes. Furthermore, some
states have a state estate tax exemption amount of just $1 million, meaning the
bequests of many estates that would fall under the $5 million federal exemption
would still be subject to state inheritance taxes.43 In these scenarios, because no
federal estate taxes were paid, the taxpayer would not be able to benefit from the
deduction for state death taxes.
The effect of these changes and EGTRRA in general should not be
underestimated. Despite eighty years of revenue sharing of estate taxes, "EGTRRA
completely altered the prevailing state death tax landscape"' and "[t]he result is a
seemingly non-stop progression of new state estate tax laws, often enacted with
concern only for preserving state revenue and without adequate consideration for
4 Joel Michael, State Estate, Inheritance, and Gift Taxes Five Years After EGTRRA, 42 ST. TAX
NOTES 871,880 (2006).
42 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-312, § 302(a)(1), 124 Stat. 3296, 3301 (2010).
4' See Cooper, Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 865-68.
4Id. at 876.
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the complexities that result."45 Although the repeal of the state estate tax credit has
resulted in some benefits to taxpayers, such as the gift tax loophole, this loophole
also suggests that little thought was put into the long-term consequences of the
repeal of the state credit, suggesting instead that the repeal was merely passed as a
quick source of revenue to help lessen the financial burdens of a lofty political
proposal.
This loophole allows conscientious taxpayers to avoid paying either state or
federal taxes upon death due to the discrepancy between the federal and state estate
tax exemption amounts, coupled with the increase in the federal gift tax exemption.
Traditionally, the federal gift tax has served as a backstop to the estate tax to
prevent taxpayers from avoiding estate taxes by simply giving their money away
before death. This objective was accomplished by a gift tax exemption at or below
the estate tax exemption. The federal gift tax exemption amount has continued to
serve as a backstop to the federal estate tax, as both the federal estate tax and gift
tax exemption amounts have increased to greater than $5 million, but many state
estate taxes still have estate tax exemption amounts of around $1 million.
Consequently, because many of these states do not have state gift tax restrictions,
this increase in the federal gift tax exemption amount allows a taxpayer subject to
state estate tax to simply give away an amount less than the federal gift tax
exemption, potentially resulting in no gift tax or state estate tax liability.
In some states, though, this loophole does not exist due to state gift taxes or
state "gift-in-contemplation-of-death" rules. In Kentucky, for instance, all transfers
made in contemplation of death are subject to inheritance tax.' 6 A transfer of a
material part of a donor's estate made within three years of the donor's death is
presumed to be transferred in contemplation of death and is taxed under the
inheritance tax statute unless the contrary is shown.47 Notably, this presumption is
different from the federal rule, which "does not presume that the transfer was made
in contemplation of death irrespective of when the transfer was made." s
Additionally, even transfers made beyond the three-year window may be
determined to be in contemplation of death and thus subject to state inheritance
tax in Kentucky.49
" Cooper et al., supra note 27, at 319.
46 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.020 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.).
47 Id. § 140.020(2); see also id. § 140.030 (relating to the imposition of tax on contracts in
contemplation of death).
48 5 J. MARTIN BURKE ET AL., MODERN ESTATE PLANNING § 70.22 (2d ed.), LEXIS (database
updated 2015).
" § 140.020(2) (Westlaw).
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II. THE CURRENT DEATH TAX SCHEME IN KENTUCKY
A. Kentucky's (Lack of) Estate Tax
After the repeal of the state death tax credit in EGTRRA on January 1, 2005,
there has been no state estate tax in Kentucky. Previously, Kentucky's estate tax was
equal to the amount by which the credits for the state death tax allowed under the
federal tax law exceeded the inheritance tax, less any discount.50 Importantly,
although there is no current state death tax credit on the federal estate tax return
from which to assess a Kentucky estate tax, the Kentucky estate tax remains on the
books to be imposed if federal law reinstates a state death tax credit in the future.5 1
Notably, the retention of this pick-up tax means that taxpayers in Kentucky suffer
from tax uncertainty that would result in the event that a federal estate tax credit
ever resurfaces.
B. Kentucky's Inheritance Tax
Unlike the Kentucky estate tax, which has not been assessed since the repeal of
the state death tax credit in EGTRRA, the Kentucky inheritance tax continues to
be imposed on "each transfer of assets at death from a decedent to each particular
individual heir, beneficiary, or other transferee." 2 Specifically, the Kentucky
inheritance tax is an excise tax on a beneficiary's right to receive property from a
deceased person. 3 Kentucky courts have specified that the "tax must have
something upon which to operate [and] . . . the thing taxed is the privilege of
transferring."54 Succinctly, the Kentucky inheritance tax is grounded upon four
factors: (1) the passage of tide, (2) by reason of death, (3) from the decedent, (4) to
the beneficiary or beneficiaries.55 A Kentucky appellate court found that when the
decedent specifies that the estate should pay any Kentucky inheritance taxes, the
beneficiary must then pay inheritance tax on the portion of tax paid by the estate
because it is an additional benefit or gift received by the beneficiary.56
so Inheritance and Estate Tax, KY. DEPr REVENUE (last updated Feb. 25, 2016),
http://revenue.ky.gov/individual/inherittax.htm.
"' § 140.130 (Westlaw). An estate tax in addition to the Kentucky inheritance tax is assessed when
the state death tax credit allowed on the federal return (attributable to Kentucky property) exceeds the
Kentucky inheritance tax. The difference between the federal credit and the inheritance tax must be paid
to Kentucky as an estate tax. Id.
2 See Jeffrey S. Dible, A Straight Path to Inheritance Tax Repeal, RES GESTAE, Apr. 2012, at 10,10.
s3 Martin v. Storrs, 126 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky. 1939).
54 Id.
55 Dep't of Revenue v. Lanham's Adm'rs, 128 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Ky. 1939) (citing Helvering v. St.
Louis Union Tr. Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935)).
16 Estate of McVey v. Dep't of Revenue, Fin. & Admin. Cabinet, No. 2012-CA-000840-MR,
2013 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1008, at "1, *6, *19 (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2013). This is similar to the
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Property that is subject to the Kentucky inheritance tax includes all property
belonging to a resident of Kentucky except for real estate located in another state.5
7
Real estate and personal property located in Kentucky and owned by a nonresident
and not taxable elsewhere is also subject to Kentucky's tax."s Intangible property of
both residents and non-residents is subject to the inheritance tax if the property has
a tax situs in Kentucky and is not taxable elsewhere. 59
Importantly, property transferred to certain beneficiaries falls under a statutory
exception for certain types of transfers and is not subject to the Kentucky
inheritance tax. Transfers to charitable, religious, or educational institutions, or on
transfers to cities, towns, or public institutions in the state are not subject to the
Kentucky inheritance tax as long as the transfer is for public purposes. 60
Additionally, Kentucky also exempts from inheritance tax any payment made by
the federal government to a decedent's surviving spouse or heir in respect of a
decedent's war service. 6 1
Through its tax structure, Kentucky also exempts certain beneficiaries from all
or part of the inheritance tax. The inheritance tax rate and amount of inheritance
tax owed depends on the relationship of the beneficiary to the deceased person and
the value of the property. Generally, the closer the relationship, the greater the
exemption and the smaller the tax rate. 62 Class A beneficiaries, which mainly
include surviving spouses, parents, children, grandchildren, siblings, and half-
siblings are exempt from paying Kentucky inheritance tax up to the amounts
specified by the statute.63 Class B beneficiaries, which include nieces, nephews,
half-nieces, half-nephews, children-in-law, 64  aunts, uncles, and great-
grandchildren, receive a $1,000 exemption and then are taxed at rates from four
percent to sixteen percent.65 Class C beneficiaries, which include all persons not
included as A or B beneficiaries, like cousins, receive only a $500 exemption and
then are taxed at rates ranging from six to sixteen percent. 6 The exact language of
the members of each class and the relevant tax rates are included below.
taxability of employers paying employee income taxes in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner. See
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
17 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.010 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. § 140.060.
61 Id. § 140.015.
62 See generally id. § 140.070.
63 Id. § 140.080.
64 A house bill filed on July 15, 2014, proposed the removal of sons- and daughters-in-law from
Class B beneficiaries and added them to the list of Class A beneficiaries. H.B. 17, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2014).
15 Id..§ 140.070(2); id. § 140.080(d).
66 Id. § 140.070(3); id. § 140.080(e).
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Class A Beneficiaries67
[P]arent, surviving spouse, child by blood, stepchild, child adopted
during infancy, child adopted during adulthood who was reared by the
decedent during infancy or a grandchild who is the issue of a child by
blood, the issue of a stepchild, the issue of a child adopted during
adulthood who was reared by the decedent during infancy, the issue of a
child adopted during infancy, brother, sister, or brother or sister of the
half-blood.
Class B Beneficiaries 68
[N]ephew, niece, or a nephew or niece of the half blood, daughter-
in-law, son-in-law, aunt or uncle, or a great-grandchild who is the
grandchild of a child by blood, of a stepchild or of a child adopted
during infancy.
Amount of bequest Tax Rate
Less than $10,000 4%
Exceeding $10,000, but not exceeding $20,000 5%
Exceeding $20,000, but not exceeding $30,000 6%
Exceeding $30,000, but not exceeding $45,000 8%
Exceeding $45,000, but not exceeding $60,000 10%
Exceeding $60,000, but not exceeding $100,000 12%
Exceeding $100,000, but not exceeding $200,000 14%
Exceeding $200,000 16%
Class C Beneficiaries 69
[A]ny educational, religious, or other institutions, societies, or
associations, or to any cities, towns, or public institutions not exempted
by KRS 140.060, or to any person not included in either Class A or
Class B.
Amount of bequest Tax Rate
Less than $10,000 6%
Exceeding $10,000, but not exceeding $20,000 8%
Exceeding $20,000, but not exceeding $30,000 10%
Exceeding $30,000, but not exceeding $45,000 12%
Exceeding $45,000, but not exceeding $60,000 14%
Exceeding $60,000 16%
67 Id. § 140.070(1).
- Id. § 140.070(2).
69 Id. § 140.070(3).
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C. The Trend in Other States
After EGTRRA, roughly half of the states imposed some form of state death
taxes.7" However, by 2016 only four states still impose a state inheritance tax
(Nebraska,7 Iowa,7' Kentucky,73 and Pennsylvania74). Twelve states impose only a
state estate tax (Connecticut,75 Hawaii, 76 Illinois, 77 Maine,78 Massachusetts,
79
Minnesota,"° New York,8 Oregon,82 Rhode Island,83 Vermont,8 4 Washington,85
and Washington, D.C.8 6). Two states, Maryland8 7 and New Jersey,88 impose both
estate and inheritance taxes. Recently, Tennessee,89 Indiana,90 Ohio, 9' and North
Carolina92 have phased out or repealed state death taxes, while other states like
Connecticut 9 and Maryland9 4 have decreased their exemption amounts. Steps have
' Elizabeth McNichol, Many States Are Decoupling from the Federal Estate Tax Cut, CTR.
BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES (May 23, 2002), http://www.cbpp.org/research/many-states-are-
decoupling-from-the-federal-estate-tax-cut.
71 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-2001 (West, Westlaw through the end of the first Reg. Sess. of the
104th Leg.).
72 IOWA CODE ANN. § 450.2 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.).
' § 140.070(3) (Westlaw).
71 72 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9106 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. Acts 1
to 51).
75 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-391 (West, Westlaw through enactments from the 2015 Reg.
Sess. and the June Spec. Sess.).
76 HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 236E-8 (West, Westlaw through Act 243 [End] of the 2015 Reg.
Sess.).
77 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/3 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-484 of the 2015 Reg. Sess.).
71 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4063 (Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 127th Leg.).
71 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 65C, § 2A (West, Westlaw through Chapter 122, except for Ch.
119 of the 2015 1st Ann. Sess.).
80 MINN. STAT. ANN. §291.03 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 First Spec. Sess.).
81 N.Y. TAX LAW § 925 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2015, chapters 1 to 411).
52 OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118.010 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. legis. Effective
through Oct. 5, 2015).
8 44 R-I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 44-22-1.1 (West, Westlaw through chapter 285 of the Jan. 2015
sess.).
14 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7442a (West, Westlaw through the First Sess. of the 2015-2016 Vt.
Gen. Assemb.).
85 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 83.100.040 (West, Wesdaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. and 2015
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Spec. Sess.).
8 D.C. CODE. ANN. § 47-3702 (West, Westlaw through Oct. 21, 2015).
17 MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. §§ 7-202, -302 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. of
the Gen. Assemb.).
NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 54:41-1, :38-1 (West, Westlaw through L.2015, c. 120 and J.R. No.7).
9 2012 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1057.
0 H.B. 1001, 118th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013).
9' Sub H.B. 3, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011-12).
92 H.B. 998, 2013 Sess. Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2013).
93 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-391(a)-(b) (West, Westlaw through enactments from the 2015
Reg. Sess. and the June Spec. Sess.); Ebeling, supra note 6.
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also been taken in Oregon to repeal the state estate tax.9 5 The decreasing number of
states that still enforce state death taxes indicates a dear trend of states are moving
away from the collection of state estate and inheritance taxes.
Even in a time of budget shortfalls across the country, very few states have
opted to increase state death taxes in recent years. However, although many states
have repealed state death taxes, some outliers have chosen to implement lower
exemption amounts or more severe state death taxes. In 2011, Connecticut lowered
its state estate tax exemption amount from $3.5 million to $2 million per estate. 96
Additionally, Illinois resurrected an estate tax in 2011.97 However, Illinois increased
its estate tax exemption from an original $2 million exemption to $4 million as of
January 1, 2013. 9
I. KENTUCKY NEEDS TO REPEAL STATE INHERITANCE TAX
As one of only four states with a state inheritance tax, Kentucky would be well-
advised to follow the trends of nearby states like Indiana, Ohio, Tennessee and
North Carolina and repeal the state death tax. Although the best solution for all
states would be for the states to share in the federal estate tax revenue by Congress
giving a credit for paid state death taxes again, this seems unlikely given current
federal budget shortfalls. However, articles have been written urging Congress to
opt for this revenue-sharing plan again.9 9 Given that the resurrection of the credit
is unlikely, Kentucky must consider repeal or other solutions in order to remain
competitive and attract wealthy retirees. By repealing the inheritance tax, Kentucky
can attract wealthy taxpayers who will no longer have to worry about tax
assessments on wealth transfers upon death. These taxpayers will also spend money
and add to state sales tax and property tax revenue during their lives.
Currently, Kentucky's maximum inheritance tax rates are the second highest in
the country."° In addition to being unpopular, Kentucky's inheritance tax unfairly
punishes certain individuals, like those with insufficient tax planning and non-
traditional families, and encourages ante-mortem capital flight. Furthermore, the
revenue generated from Kentucky's inheritance tax does not outweigh the negatives
that result. Finally, the supporters of the Kentucky inheritance tax lack persuasive
94 H.B. 739, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014); see also MD. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. §§
7-305, -309(a)-(b) (West, Westlaw though the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
9 See Ashlea Ebeling, Ohio Repeals Its Estate Tax; Maine and Oregon Tweak Theirs, FORBES
(June 30, 2011, 12:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2011/06/30/ohio-estate-tax-
repeal-maine-oregon-tweak-tax/.
6 Ebeling, supra note 6.
97 Id.
98 Id.
9 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Cooper, Time for Permanent Estate Tax Reform, 81 UMKC L. REv. 277,
284-86 (2012)." Ebeling, supra note 4.
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reasons to keep the tax as the inheritance tax does not accomplish the supposed
goals of death taxes like income redistribution.
A. The Kentucky Inheritance Tax Unfairly Targets Certain Individuals
The Kentucky inheritance tax unevenly impacts certain individuals by
punishing those without sufficient tax planning, in non-traditional families, and
who own family businesses. First, by carefilly utilizing estate planning, many
taxpayers who would otherwise subject their beneficiaries to the Kentucky
inheritance tax are able to shield much of their income from taxation upon death by
taking advantage of gifts during their lives and other tax planning strategies. The
increase in the federal gift exemption has exacerbated this problem, as people with
effective tax planning are able to make larger gifts during their lives and thus avoid
paying any state estate or inheritance tax upon death. The people that tend to be
hit the hardest by state death taxes are those who die unexpectedly or have their
assets tied up in illiquid holdings. Thus, the Kentucky inheritance tax unfairly
targets those individuals.
Furthermore, the Kentucky inheritance tax unfairly penalizes non-traditional
families, such as unmarried couples, both heterosexual and homosexual, regardless
of whether they have children.' 0 ' Because Kentucky's classification of beneficiaries
imposes a high tax rate on bequests to friends, caretakers, and all non-relatives,'0 2
Kentucky's inheritance tax scheme would result in high tax rates paid on a bequest
to a domestic partner or other similar relationship. This issue is of particular
importance to many Americans, and specifically, many Kentuckians.
Nontraditional families comprise a significant portion of the United State
population.0 3 In fact, in 2010, forty-five percent of all households in the United
States were unmarried.0 4 Closer to home, the 2010 U.S. Census indicated that
Kentucky is similar to the national average number of U.S. households of
unmarried partners with children.0" Moreover, in a 2012 Gallup Poll, 3.9 percent
101 See Living Together Legal & Financial FA.Q, UNMARRIED EQUALITY,
http://www.unmarried.org/cohabitation/legal-financial/faq/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2016). This inequality
is especially impactful given the growing prevalence of unmarried couples in the United States.
Statistics, UNMARRIED EQUALITY, www.unmarriecLorg/statistics/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2016).
102 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.070 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.); cE
Brittany J. Faulkner, Note, "The Ugly Stepsister"-Inheriting the Defects of Nebraska's Inheritance
Tax, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 285, 304 (2013) (stating that Nebraska beneficiaries are subject to higher
tax rate when they are in a non-traditional family or a non-family member).
" See Statistics, supra note 101.
104Id.
s See Jonathan Vespa et al., America's Families and Living Arrangements: 2012, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, Aug. 2013, at 1, 19, fig. 7.
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of Kentuckians identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered ("LGBT").1°
With this percentage, Kentucky has the twelfth highest LGBT population by
percentage in the United States."0 7 Similarly, both Lexington and Louisville,
Kentucky have both been included on a list entitled "6 Surprising Places It's Great
To Be Gay."0 8
The Kentucky inheritance tax also unfairly targets family businesses that are not
transferred to Class A beneficiaries. The tax encourages firms to structure as
corporations instead of as more closely-held entities like partnerships, because
corporations do not pay taxes when the person leading the business changes.0 9
Family businesses that are not incorporated, however, may be subject to high
Kentucky inheritance tax rates if transferred to family members not included as
Class A beneficiaries."0 This can create special issues in the case of illiquid assets,
where an asset, such as a farm, must be sold to pay the tax due.
B. The Kentucky Inheritance Tax Encourages Ante-Mortem Capital Flight
Perhaps most importantly, the repeal of the state death tax credit has resulted in
a renewed interstate competition for wealthy retirees, just like in 1924 before the
passage of the state death tax credit. The elimination of state death taxes in many
states has encouraged "state-shopping" by taxpayers and has created a "race to the
bottom" that will presumably leave states with increasingly less revenue from state
death taxes."' As Professor Cooper explained:
Amid this backdrop, state leaders seem to be presented with a choice: lose your
state death taxes or lose your wealthy residents. A past generation of state leaders
faced a similar conflict and confronted a similar decision. Presented with the
choice of losing state residents or abandoning state death taxes, they were
prepared to choose the latter. The Congress of 1926 preempted that decision.
The Congress of [today] seems unlikely to take similar action.
As such, state leaders [today] may have no political choice but to finish what their
predecessors started. Looking out across the new death tax landscape after
" GaryJ. Gates & Frank Newport, LGBT Percentage Highest in D.C., Lowest in North Dakota,
GALLUP POLITICS (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160517/lgbt-percentage-highest-
lowest-north-dakota.aspx.
107Id.
'" Heather Cronk, 6 Surprising Place It's Great To Be Gay, ALTERNET (June 2, 2011),
http://www.altemet org/story/151173/6 surprisingplaces it%27s great-to-be-gay V28da~las%2C tex
as%29.
0 Tax Found. Staff, Special Report: The Fiscal Cliff. A Primer, TAX FOUND., Nov. 13, 2012,
available at http://taxfoundation.org/artide/fiscal-cliff-primer.
11' See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 140.070(2)-(3) (West, Westlaw though the end of the 2015 Reg.
Sess.).
11 Rebecca Safford, Note, Information Asymmetry, Race, and the 'Death Tax,"13 WASH. &LEE
J. C.R & Soc. JusT. 117, 136 (2006).
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EGTRRA, modern state leaders may consider it futile to compete with Florida
and other death tax havens. They may simply decide that state death tax revenues
come at too high a political cost and turn elsewhere for needed tax dollars." 2
Many state politicians have chosen to turn the fiscal challenge of disappearing
death tax revenue into a marketing opportunity. Florida is a perfect example of this
resourcefuilness. After the passage of EGTRRA, "[w]hile leaders in many other
states focused on drafting new tax legislation [to replace lost revenue], Florida
Governor Jeb Bush appointed a 'Destination Florida Commission'... in order to
'evaluate Florida's competitive position in attracting retirees and to recommend
ways to make Florida more retiree friendly.' 11 3 Among other recommendations,
the Commission's believed that Florida should continue its favorable tax policies." 4
As Professor Cooper noted, "The original tax haven is back in business."" 5
Kentuckians must already suffer through cold winters, allergies, and state
income tax. In order to compete with states like Florida, Kentucky must remove
the incentive of relocating and repeal the state inheritance tax. Although the action
may initially result in less revenue, many studies indicate that high state death taxes
may be "financially self-defeating" and cause a greater loss in income and property
taxes due to capital flight." 6 In fact, a 2011 study by a think tank in Rhode Island
examined Census Bureau migration data and discovered that "from 1995 to 2007
Rhode Island collected $341.3 million from the estate tax while it lost $540 million
in other taxes due to out-migration." Not all of those people left because of taxes,
but the study found evidence that "the most significant driver of out-migration is
the estate tax."1 17
A 2008 study by the Connecticut Department of Revenue Services also
supports this conclusion. The Department found that "the 26 states without an
estate tax produced twice as many jobs from 2004-07 and had a growth rate 50%
faster than those with estate taxes."11 s Furthermore, the study showed that the
average taxable income of those leaving Connecticut was $446,000, and the average
estate of those leaving was $7.5 million. "9
More generally, country-wide data suggests that the same migration trend in
Rhode Island and Connecticut is true for other states with state death taxes.
According to Tax Foundation data, nine of the fourteen states that had a state
112 Cooper, Interstate Competition, supra note 10, at 880.
"' Id. at 878-79.
.. Id. at 879.
115 Id.
..6 See Death Tax Ambush: Many States Now Have Crushing Burdens, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 8,
2011, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/artices/SB10001424052748703960804576120050963075390#livefyre-comment.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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estate tax had net outflows of both filers and adjusted gross income between 2000
and 2010.2' Similarly, "five of the seven states with a state inheritance tax had net
outflows totaling $22.8 billion between 2000 and 2010." 21 To the contrary,
nineteen of the thirty-one states "without either [an inheritance or estate tax] had a
net inflow of tax filers and [adjusted gross income]."'22
Beyond the hard data supporting this migration trend, anecdotal evidence also
indicates that wealthy taxpayers are leaving states to avoid state death taxes.
Speaking particularly about Indiana, the author of a legislative update claimed that
even when there is no data to support capital flight, "every Indiana trust and estate
lawyer can think of at least one wealthy business owner or retiree who has sought or
followed advice on how to legally avoid the inheritance tax by changing his or her
residence to another state."2 3
Additionally, tax planning articles encourage clients who own a second home in
a state that does not impose a death tax to change their domicile to result in a lower
tax burden upon their death.' By repealing the Kentucky inheritance tax, the
incentive of relocating to avoid Kentucky's inheritance tax would disappear, and
many people, their capital assets, and the income those capital assets generate
would remain in Kentucky.
C. The Kentucky Inheritance Tax Revenue Amount Does Not Justify Its
Continuance
When analyzing the effectiveness of the Kentucky inheritance tax, it is also
important to consider the amount of revenue the tax collects. A large amount of
revenue could possibly justify the tax's unfair targeting and the capital flight it
causes, but the actual revenue collected from the tax is small. As shown in the table
below, the inheritance tax revenue represents a very small percentage of the
Kentucky general fund and has decreased markedly since the disappearance of the
federal estate tax credit. 25
120 Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Where Not to Die, 140 TAX NOTES 1470 (2013).
121 Id.
1 Id.2 Dible, supra note 52, at 10.
124 Gagliardi, supra note 31. "The question of domicile is determined based on a number of factors
and the taxpayer generally bears the burden to prove a change of domicile. The general common law test
for domicile requires the establishment of a physical residence and the intent to permanently remain
there." Id.
' This table was created from data provided by the Kentucky Office of State Budget Director, see
KY. OFFICE OF THE STATE BUDGET DIR., QUARTERLY ECONOMIC AND REVENUE REPORT:
FOURTH QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2011 ANNUAL REPORT (2011),
http://osbcLky.gov/Publications/Quarterly%2Economic%2and%20Revenue%2Reports%20%2OFisca
%204/11-4thQrtRevenue.pdf and KY. OFFICE OF THE STATE BUDGET DiR., QUARTERLY
ECONOIC AND REVENUE REPORT: FOURTH QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2014 ANNUAL EDITION
(2014),
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Kentucky General Fund (S million)
Revenue Sources for Fiscal Years 2005-2014
Inheritance Tax Total General % of General
Revenue Fund Fund
2002 83,359,872 6,560,216,551 1.27%
2003 95,864,480 6,783,458,295 1.41%
2004 66,083,705 6,977,623,200 0.95%
2005 63,174,866 7,645,046,634 0.83%
2006 45,990,266 8,376,083,216 0.55%
2007 43,578,107 8,573,819,250 0.51%
2008 51,001,299 8,664,336,663 0.59%
2009 41,234,240 8,426,351,594 0.49%
2010 37,201,611 8,225,127,620 0.45%
2011 41,350,929 8,759,442,646 0.47%
2012 41,312,904 9,090,954,645 0.45%
2013 41,326,220 9,348,326,000 0.44%
2014 45,843,849 9,462,035,017 0.48%
Moreover, the revenue generated from the Kentucky inheritance tax seems
especially insignificant when considering the compliance costs generally associated
with estate tax systems. A 2012 Senate Joint Economics Committee Report
concluded that the compliance costs associated with the collection of the federal
estate tax are actually higher than the amount of revenue that the tax collects. 126
Therefore, some economists consider the entire estate planning industry as
economic waste, because the high-skilled labor and capital utilized in the estate
planning industry would be applied to other, more productive economic endeavors
if the estate tax were repealed. 127 This Joint Committee study conflicted with a
1999 study often cited by death tax supporters that claimed that estate tax
http://osbd.ky.gov/Publications/Quarterly%2Economic%20and%2ORevenue%2Reports%20%2Fiscal
%201/14-4thQrtRevenue.pdf.
126 STAFF STUDY OF JOINT ECON. COMM. REPUBLICANS, COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX 1, 18 (2012), available at
http://www.jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Flles.Serve&File-id=bc9424cl-8897-4dbd-bl4c -
a17c9c5380a3; see also David Block & Scott Drenkard, The Estate Tax: Even Worse Than the
Republicans Say, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 4, 2012), http://taxfoundafion.org/article/estate-tax-even-worse-
republicans-say (citing the Committee's study).
"2 Block & Drenkard, supra note 126.
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administrative and compliance costs only cost about seven percent of total estate tax
revenue. 128
Although no studies have specifically analyzed the compliance costs for
Kentucky's inheritance tax, the costs are likely to be high given that the inheritance
tax affects not only very wealthy people, but all who wish to leave assets to anyone
other than a Class A beneficiary. In order to maximize these gifts, many
Kentuckians may seek estate planning help to learn how to gift away assets during
their lives instead. Even the costs of simply filling out death tax returns may be very
costly. For example, in our neighboring state of Indiana, "it is not unusual for the
costs of preparing and filing the inheritance tax return to be two to four times the
net tax due on the return. 29
. Additionally, the complexity of state death taxes and the possibility of being
taxed in multiple states may also push some Kentuckians to seek estate planning
guidance. This complexity is exacerbated by the fact that those in a state that
imposes a state estate or inheritance tax may not take advantage of the portability
election to minimize their exposure to state death taxes. 30 This is especially
significant because Congress hoped portability would make estate planning much
simpler, with "[a] witness before the Senate Finance Committee in 2008 even
assert[ing] that portability '[would] eliminate the need for many married
individuals to have estate planning.'" '131 Kentucky does simplify the process by
allowing the filing of an Affidavit of Exemption when no Kentucky inheritance tax
is due and where the estate does not have to be filed.'32 The proper filing of an
affidavit saves money and time that would otherwise have been expended to
prepare inheritance and estate tax returns. However, this does not eliminate the
inheritance tax planning costs for those on whose estates the Kentucky inheritance
tax is due.
D. Current Arguments in Favor of Keeping Death Taxes are Weak
Supporters of state death taxes argue that death taxes are favorable because they
help to break up concentrated wealth, accomplish goals of redistribution, provide
" Charles Davenport &Jay A. Soled, Enlivening the Death-Tax Death-Talk 84 TAX NOTES 591
(1999).
129 Dible, supra note 52, at 10.
'3 Deborah L. Jacobs, A Married Couple's Guide to Estate Planning, FORBES Jan. 9, 2013, 3:14
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/ 0/9/a-married-couples-guide-to-estate-
planning/#2715e4857aOb5fb8c7d69b89; see also Trisha Farrow, Comment, The Not-So-Simple Estate
Plan ofBreaking Bad's Walter White 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 955, 967-68 (2014).
131 Farrow, supra note 130, at 956 (citing STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG.,
TAXATION ON WEALTH TRANSFERS WITHIN A FAMILY: A DISCUSSION OF SELECTED AREAS OF
POSSIBLE REFORM 10 (Comm. Print 2008)).
132 Ky. DEP'T OF REVENUE, KENTUCKY INHERITANCE AND ESTATE TAX FORMS AND
INSTRUCTIONS (2008).
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much-needed revenue to states, encourage charitable giving, and place assets in the
hands of buyers who will theoretically increase their economic efficiency. However,
Kentucky's inheritance tax does not significantly accomplish any of these objectives.
First, supporters argue that death taxes provide wealth redistribution. While
high amounts of wealth concentration have been shown to correlate with lower
national economic performance and harm the democratic process, most
commentators agree that death taxes have largely failed to significantly break up
targeted wealth concentration, 133 and numerous studies have debunked the myth
that estate taxes may, at any level, accomplish these goals. In fact, some research
shows that estate taxes may actually increase income inequality by reducing savings
and driving up returns on capital, both of which generally benefit wealthy holders
of capital. 3 4 This research supports the worldwide trend, which shows that as
inequality has risen in the developed world, many governments have been
dismantling-not increasing-estate taxes. Austria, Canada, and Sweden have
recently abolished estate taxes outright.'35
Furthermore, studies have indicated a weak correlation between income
inequality and inherited wealth. One study, for instance, found that only two
percent of income inequality was attributed to inherited wealth.' 36 Even those
arguing that inherited wealth creates unfair benefits for beneficiaries recognize that
the strong correlation between parent and child income result from many different
factors-not just inherited wealth.'37 Specifically, "[tlhere are many factors driving
the high intergenerational correlation between parent and child economic status,"
such as parental education, race, inherited personality traits, and financial
inheritance.' 38
The argument of an inheritance tax providing income distribution is especially
dicey given that the current classification of beneficiaries promotes the
accumulation the wealth within the close family as opposed to spreading the wealth
around.'39 Finally, this data ignores the morally reprehensible reasons for taking the
accumulated wealth of one and giving it to others. Elizabeth Carter, a law professor
at Louisiana State University, stated succinctly that, "by attempting to ensure equal
... See, e.g., Safford, supra note 111, at 127.
... Joseph E. Stiglitz, Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution, and the Concept of Balanced Growth
Path Incidence, 86 J. POL. ECON. S137, at S138 (1978); David S. Logan, The Economic Effects of the
Estate Tax, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://taxfoundation.org/article/economic-effects-estate-tax-
testimony-david-s-logan-pennsylvania-house-finance-committee.
13' Kenneth F. Scheve, Jr. & David Stasavage, Is the Estate Tax Doomed?, N.Y. TIMES
OPINIONATOR (Mar. 24, 2013, 9:03 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/is-the-
estate-tax-doomed/.
136 ALAN S. BLINDER, TOWARD AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 123 n.5-
7 (1974).
' Batchelder, supra note 2, at 24.
139 Id.
139 Elizabeth R. Carter, New Life for the Death Tax Debate, 90 DENV. U.L. REv. 175, 186 (2012).
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access to the American dream by penalizing only those who have fulfilled its
promise, the ... estate tax places fundamental American values in irreconcilable
conflict."'" Carter's work focused on federal estate tax, but the principle is equally
applicable to state estate tax.
It is also important to note that estate and inheritance taxes were not developed
for the purpose of reducing income inequality. Instead, state death taxes were first
introduced simply because it was easier for governments to record the value of an
estate than to track income on an annual basis. 14 1
Second, the argument that repealing the Kentucky inheritance tax would result
in too much lost revenue for Kentucky provides little support. As previously
explained, repealing the inheritance tax may decrease state revenue in the short
term, but it would maintain the state's tax base and may increase state revenue in
the long term by encouraging wealthy taxpayers to stay in Kentucky to die--and
thus to continue paying more valuable state income and property taxes.
Furthermore, the Kentucky inheritance tax represents a very small portion of the
Kentucky general fund, so shortfalls in the short term would not be prohibitively
large.
Third, supporters of death taxes argue that by eliminating the preferable tax-
exempt status of charitable bequests, people are less likely to leave property to
charities at their death. This argument has some weight, as the Congressional
Budget Office speculated that the repeal of the federal estate tax would result in a
decline of charitable bequests by sixteen to twenty-eight percent. 42 However, some
experts have argued against these dire predictions, stating instead that "the nation's
wealthy have come to see philanthropy as a core part of their identity" and give
more during their, lifetimes and continue to do so in wils. 4' Additionally, bequests
represent less than ten percent of total charitable gifts,'" so even a small decrease in
charitable bequests in Kentucky would not greatly hamper charities.
CONCLUSION
The passage of EGTRRA completely altered estate taxation in America, and
what is perhaps the most fundamental change-the repeal of the state death tax
credit-is far from the most obvious. The race to the bottom among states to
decrease their state death taxes in order to attract wealthy retireees is reminiscent of
"4 Id. at 177-78.
141 Scheve & Stasavage, supra note 135.
142 Kristine S. Knaplund, Charity for the "Death Tax" The Impact of Legislation on Charitable
Bequests, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 713, 716 (2009-10).
143 Analisa Nazareno, The Great Giveaway: Experts Argue that Philanthropy is an Ingrained Part
of the Wealthy's Identity, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 28, 2004, at 10H, available at 2004
WLNR 21707278.
144 Charitable Giving Statistics, NATL PHILANTHROPIC TR. (2013),
http://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/.
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the situation in 1924 before Congress passed the state death tax credit. However,
the prospects of Congress stepping in today and protecting death-tax-imposing
states like Kentucky are slim to none. Instead, to no longer be considered a "where
not to die" state, Kentucky must follow the majority trend and repeal the state
inheritance tax.
This issue is of incredible importance to Kentuckians, because unlike an estate
tax, which affects only a small portion of individuals, nearly all Kentuckians will
become subject to an inheritance tax at some point in their lifetime. 4 ' Particularly,
many Kentucky taxpayers who are subject to the state inheritance tax are not
multimillionaires. Instead, they are people like family farmers that happen to own
assets with an aggregate value above the exemption level. By no means are they
rich. Most of the money they earn is reinvested toward farming-related assets.
Thus, when the taxpayer dies and the asset is passed on to someone that owes
Kentucky inheritance tax (meaning anyone but a Class A Beneficiary), the
beneficiary often has little or no money to pay the required inheritance tax.
Furthermore, Kentucky's inheritance tax unfairly targets certain individuals, like
non-traditional families, encourages ante-mortem capital flight, and does not
generate enough revenue to justify its enforcement. To maintain its
competitiveness, Kentucky must repeal the state inheritance tax and keep its
wealthy tax-paying residents at home.
14 See Faulkner, supra note 102, at 285 (noting that almost every Nebraskan will be subject to the
inheritance tax by Nebraska's similar inheritance tax statute).
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